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Deficits, Interest Rates, Crowding Out 
A spectre is haunting the financial com-
munity -the  spectre of rising Federal budget 
deficits. Fears are rampant that coming 
deficits, by keeping interest rates high, will 
severely retard -'crowd out' -private 
investment, particu larly in key sectors such as 
housing and autos. Almost certainly, these 
worries help explain the present extraordi-
narily high level of long-term interest rates, 
which in turn has dimmed hopes for a 
vigorous recovery from the present recession. 
Not all observers, though, see such dire con-
sequences. Supply-siders maintain that the 
Administration's tax cuts will stimulate 
private savings enough to finance higher 
government  borrowing and a boom in invest-
ment. Moreover, one former administration 
advisor, John Rutledge (President, Claremont 
Economics Institute) argued recently in the 
Wall Street Journal that private investors 
would be willing to absorb projected 
increases in Federal debt without substantial 
interest-rate hikes, in part because of  the 
increasing attractiveness of  financial assets in 
an environment of  declining inflation. 
Sti II, both sides of  the controversy generally 
view deficits, interest rates, and crowding out 
as inextricably linked, in the sense that any 
crowding out would be accomplished 
through the mechanism of interest-rate 
increases. Pessimists thus tend to see interest 
rates as remaining very high for some years to 
come, while optimists on the matter of 
deficits and interest rates are often more 
optimistic about crowding out as well. But in 
fact (see below) the government actions 
behind the deficits are likely to lead to 
changes in many relative prices, and not 
simply in interest rates-suggesting that 
interest rates and crowding out are not so 
rigidly linked. 
Two channels 
To many, increased deficits must push up 
interest rates because of the higher Federal 
borrowing they entail. With the government 
taking a larger share ofthe supply of  loanable 
funds, private businesses and individuals 
must be persuaded to borrow less (or lend 
more)-and how else unless borrowing is 
made more expensive? This reasoning is 
plausible, but it is also incomplete because 
deficits actually force two distinct types of 
adjustment on the economy. The first is a 
financial adjustment to the higher govern-
ment debt the public must be induced to 
hold. But since such borrowing is needed to 
finance expenditures on business capital, 
housing, and other goods and services, 
deficits also force a real adjustment on the 
public's spending. Both of  these adjustments 
can affect interest rates, but the question in 
each case is, by how much? And which is the 
more important? 
The first problem-persuading the public to 
alter its existing holdings of  securities to make 
room for more government debt -may not 
cause much of an interest-rate increase. Pro-
jected deficits, large as they are, are substan-
tially smaller than the private sector's present 
holdings of government debt-and only a 
fraction of its total wealth. The composition 
of private portfolios (i.e., the shares of alter-
native assets) thus wou  Id not have to change 
drastically to accommodate projected 
increases in Federal debt. Furthermore, the 
public's desired allocation of its wealth, 
among short-term assets at least, apparently is 
fairly responsive to changes in their yields. 
This suggests that the public is apt to digest 
the extra government debt without any sub-
stantial rise in interest rates-partkularly as 
declining inflation makes financial assets 
generally more attractive (relative to tangible 
assets). 
The real deficit problem concerns what 
happens to the spending of  those private 
borrowers that cannot obtain funds when the 
government takes more. But this worry pri-IP~cdl~ff©ill  J1«~~~ffW~ 
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marily concerns commodity and factor 
markets rather than financial markets. 
Basically, deficits must compete with private 
investment for those real resources not being 
used to meet current consumption needs, that 
is, the resources provided by the nation's 
saving. The deficit and private investment 
thus are jointly constrained by the level of 
saving; given a certain level of saving, the 
more the government takes, the less private 
investors must be content with. (Admittedly, 
some resources can be borrowed from 
abroad through a current-account deficit, but 
typically the amount is fairly small in com-
parison to total saving~ or even to projected 
deficits). Higher budget deficits thus must 
crowd out some private investment in the 
absence of a rise in private saving. True, a 
conflict may be avoided temporarily if  there 
is excess capacity in the economy, and thus 
enough resources for all needs. But some 
crowding out is virtually inevitable once full 
employment is attained-unless the supply-
side argument is correct about the effects of 
tax cuts in stimulating private saving. The 
only remaining question is howthis crowding 
out will be accomplished: how will private 
investors be persuaded to spend less? 
Many ways 
Higher interest rates need not be the Qnly 
mechanism of crowding out, in part because 
investment decisions depend on far more 
than interest rates alone. Typically, a firm 
contemplating an investment projectwill first 
estimate its internal rate of return (lRR)-the 
rate that equalizes a project's (discounted) 
present cost with the present value of  the 
revenues raised from the project. This return 
is, of course, higher the more output is 
obtained for each dollar, and the higher the 
price that output can be expected to fetch. 
And the internal return is clearly lower the 
higher are the costs of labor, materials, and 
other factors used to produce the output. But 
in any case, generally only those projects are 
undertaken whose IRR's (allowing for risk) 
exceed the market interest rate, since it is 
these projects than can payoff  the interest 
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and amortization on the funds borrowed 
while still leaving some profit for the firm. 
This argument can be demonstrated by a text-
book illustration (see chart). For the economy 
as a whole, the level of investment demanded 
(10) is simply the total value of all projects 
with internal returns above the market rate. 
What happens, then, when the government 
crowds out investment (from 10 to 11) by 
raising its deficit? 
Plainly, with no change in productivity, com-
modity prices, and production costs-with 
no change in the investment-demand sched-
ule-interest rates may rise substantially. 
Indeed, they may rise high enough to force 
the cancellation of  enough previously-worth-
wh  i  Ie projects to release the saving-resources 
the government requires. This assumption is 
implicit in most analyses, and certainly it is 
hard to dispute claims that interest rates will 
have to rise very high to crowd out private 
investment if  they are the only mechanism for 
doing so.  . 
But surely, given enough time, other prices 
are nearly certain to change. After all, deficits 
arise from government tax and expenditure 
decisions that directly affect demands and 
supplies (and hence prices) for commodities 
and productive factors. Suppose, for exam-
ple, thatthe deficit rises because of  increased 
defense spending. To expand production, 
defense industries will have to attract 
resources away from other sectors by bidding 
up their prices. Non-defense sectors, faced 
with increased production costs, wi  II experi-
ence lower internal returns to investment, 
and so will reduce their demand for invest-
ment at any given interest rate (in the aggre-
.gate, the investment-demand schedule, 10, 
shifts back). Or suppose the deficit results 
from a tax cut which raises private demand 
for consumption goods. Then consumption, 
rather than defense, industries will bid up 
factor costs in an effort to attract resources. 
Still, as before, production costs will rise in 
other industries, particularly capital-goods 
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Ultimately, then, crowding out will involve 
changes in commodity and factor prices that 
lower investment demand -and not only 
interest-rate increases. Naturally, interest 
rates then will rise less (say to if rather than i1) 
when other prices vary than they wou  Id if 
they alone bore the burden of  adjustment. 
(Conceivably, interest rates might have to rise 
very little if  the adjustments in these other 
prices were great enough). Of  course, price 
changes may take considerable time, so 
,  interest rates may have to rise very sharply at 
first when a deficit begins to crowd out 
private expenditures. Subsequently, though, 
as these other prices adjust, interest rates are 
apt to fa II back -though such decl i  nes wou  Id 
not signal any reduction in 'crowding out', 
but only the working of  other mechanisms to 
accomplish it. 
Crowding out, then, may be simply an aspect 
of  a more general problem: how the private 
sector adjusts to its 'loss' of  the real resources 
used up by government expenditures. Gov-
ernment spending for goods and services 
always subtracts from resources available for 
other purposes-resources which the private 
sector must somehow be persuaded to relin-
quish. True, there may appear to be no 
crowding out when expenditures are com-
pletely financed by direct taxation. But this is 
only because the private sector releases the 
required resources mainly by the tax-caused 
reduction in disposable income rather than 
by adjustments in relative prices. Financing 
expenditures by borrowing generally causes 
a smaller reduction in current income, so that 
more of  the adjustment is apt to fall upon 
prices, including interest rates. So clearly, the 
actual adjustment to a government deficit is 
apt to depend much less on the size of  the 
deficit than upon the exact tax and expendi-
ture measures producing it. For this reason, 
there is hardly likely to be any fixed relation 
between deficits and interest rates. 
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Two lessons 
What, then, do future deficits imply for inter-
est rates and crowding out? Much depends 
on the course of saving: without a larger-
than-expected rise in saving, crowding out 
will result. However, crowding out may not 
entail interest rates remaining at anywhere 
near present levels over the next several 
years. Rates may now be high because deficit 
fears are exaggerated, or because interest 
rates now must bear the full burden of  deficit, 
or because of market uncertainties about the 
future course of monetary and fiscal policies, 
or for some other reason. But in any case, 
rates could well fall substantially in coming 
years -even if  crowd  i  ng out tu rns out to be 
severe and persistent. Of  course, if interest 
rates do fall we would still be premature to 
claim that that meant an end to the deficit 
problem, since crowding out might  simply be 
accomplished in other ways. For example, 
the housing industry is now depressed 
because high interest rates make the cost of 
owning a home so expensive. But, the 
industry's troubles will not be removed by 
falling interest rates if  defense-department 
demands bid up carpenter wages and lumber 
prices -and thus the price of houses -to 
prohibitive levels. 
Still, the industries apparently hurt the most 
by deficits-the interest-rate sensitive 
industries-may not be the worst sufferers in 
the long run. If  interest rates fall considerably, 
the most seriously affected sectors may 
instead be those which use the same (or 
similar) resources as those the government is 
now demanding in increasing quantities. For 
example, the defense build-up might drain 
scarce engineering and other technical talent 
from those high-technology electronics and 
other industries which are now producing for 
consumer and business needs-even though 
such industries are generally hurt less by high 
interest rates than are housing and autos. 
Charles Pigott BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - tbtal# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 






































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (  + )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+ )/Net borrowed{ - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
6/16/82  6/9/82 
21  114 
8  199 
3.  84 
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Dollar  Percent 
9,472  6.3 
10,763  8.4 
5,516  14.5 
4,245  8.1 
318  1.4 
,  565  35.5 
88  1.4 
1,379  - 8.9 
761  - 1.9 
519  - 1.9 
550  1.8 
14,920  18.6 
14,523  20.5 
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